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Abstract 
The fundamental role of ontology, epistemology, and ethics is widely recognised across the healthcare professions. Yet what 
is less known in physiotherapy is how ontology and epistemology potentially undermine the ethical intentions of our 
theories and practices. In this article, we draw on the work of 20th-century philosopher Emmanuel Levinas to highlight this 
problem. Particularly Levinas’s ethical critique of ontology and the associated notion of thematisation enable us to highlight 
a violence that takes place in the philosophical foundations of physiotherapy. Using the overarching aims of physiotherapy, 
the theory and practice of diagnosis, and the notion and enforcing of professional identities as examples, we additionally 
show how this violence consequently pervades physiotherapy theory and practice. By exploring a range of critical and 
practical implications, we finally show how an application of Levinas’s critique of ontology additionally opens toward an 
otherwise physiotherapy grounded in a renewed understanding of self, other, and their relation. With this, we hope to 
highlight the core value and critical need for a deeper engagement with the work of Levinas in relation to all aspects of 
physiotherapy, and particularly its understanding and implementation of ethics that is so fundamental to its practice and a 
cornerstone of physiotherapy education. 
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Background 
Emmanuel Levinas's critique of ontology and his radical 
renewal of ethics has had a lasting influence well beyond the 
confines of philosophy. It has greatly inspired research in 
areas as diverse as social and political theory, theology, arts 
and design, legal theory, international relations, and pedagogy 
(Critchley, 2002). Increasing interest in Levinas's ethics in 
healthcare theory and practice has also seen his writings 
explored in psychotherapy, medicine and nursing (Burcher, 
2011; Clifton-Soderstrom, 2003; Naef, 2006; Nortvedt, 2003; 
Surbone, 2005). Beyond a few very brief forays, however, 
Levinas's work remains underexplored in physiotherapy 
(Dufour, Brown, & Lucy, 2014; Lund Kordahl & Fougner, 
2017). This is unfortunate given the radical and fundamentally 
transformative potential that his critique of ontology and his 
otherwise ethics would have for physiotherapy theory and 
practice. This paper, therefore, sets out to introduce the 
reader to Levinas's critique of ontology and the associated 
concept of thematisation, and open a conversation about their 




The central importance of ethics and ethical relations in 
healthcare is widely recognised across the healthcare 
professions. A growing body of research has sought to refine 
our understanding and responses to increasingly complex 
ethical challenges in clinical practice, research, and education 
(Dahl-Michelsen & Groven, 2017; Kulju, Suhonen, & 
Leino-Kilpi, 2013; Lillemoen & Pedersen, 2012; Murray & 
Holmes, 2009; Swisher, 2002). Consequently, professional 
guidelines are identifying ethics as 'fundamental to the 
practice of physiotherapy', and professional bodies around the 
world are looking to provide professionals with the knowledge 
and tools necessary to meet the ethical challenges they might 
face now and into the future (PBNZ, 2011, p. 4). 
Similarly, ontology (the study of existence and being, asking, 
e.g. how things are and come to be), and epistemology (the 
study of knowledge and its acquisition, asking, e.g. how we 
come to know about things), are generally considered the 
foundations of all thought and scientific endeavour. The 
ontological and epistemological foundations of positivism and 
biomedicine stand out in the world of healthcare, having 
dominated research and practice for the past centuries 
(Nicholls, 2018; Gibson & Martin, 2003; Grant & Giddings, 
2002). As such, they have provided the philosophical 
foundations for modern-day evidence-based physiotherapy, 
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though recent years have seen a steady rise in the exploration 
of other philosophical paradigms and the divergent practices 
they can provide a foundation for (Gibson, Nicholls, Setchell, 
& Groven, 2018). What is less known in physiotherapy, 
however, is how ontology, epistemology and ethics relate to 
each other, and how fundamental this relationship is to 
physiotherapy. Levinas's work provides invaluable insights 
here. It allows us to understand the relationship and 
application of ontology, epistemology and ethics better and 
apply this to the further development of physiotherapy theory 
and practice. 
We begin this article with a brief overview of Levinas's 
personal life and philosophical trajectory, and an exposition of 
his understanding and ethical critique of ontology and the 
violence of thematisation. We review how this critique applies 
to physiotherapy by reviewing (1) the philosophical 
foundations of physiotherapy; (2) the overarching aim of 
physiotherapy; (3) the theory and practice of diagnosis; and 
(4) the notion and enforcing of professional identities. We 
conclude the article with a range of implications for 
physiotherapists looking to apply Levinas's critique of 
ontology to theory, research, and practice. 
In line with the implications of Levinas's critique of ontology, 
this paper calls on physiotherapists to carefully consider the 
unintended, yet inherent violence in relating to others from a 
position of knowledge. The paper also calls on physiotherapy 
educators in two distinct, though philosophically overlapping 
ways: firstly, by urging them to consider the philosophical 
foundations they are passing on to future physiotherapists, 
and via these, also future healthcare beneficiaries; and 
secondly, to reconsider their education theories and practices 
from this perspective with their student's as their primary 
'others' in mind. 
Our theses are: (a) that there is a significant violence inherent 
in the philosophical foundations of contemporary 
physiotherapy that is easily overlooked yet continuously 
enacted in its day-to-day theories and clinical practices; and 
(b) that the exposure of this violence calls for an otherwise 
physiotherapy that more accurately 'captures the ethical core 
and central values of healthcare' (Nortvedt, 2003, p. 25). 
The implications of this exposure are positively radical, 
questioning the very roots of our professional understanding 
and practices, and so everything built upon them. To the 
extent that they call for the development and implementation 
of radically otherwise theories and practices, there is no 
questions that sizeable constraints and limitations posed by 
existing social, professional, institutional, and legal 
boundaries surrounding physiotherapy 
would have to be dealt with in their wake. Rather than 
engaging with these here, however, in this article, we choose 
to think with Levinas in the extreme​. That is to say, we choose 
to think about physiotherapy through and with ​one​ aspect of 
his work - the critique of ontology - without constraining this 
by either pragmatic concerns, or even other aspects of his 
work that qualify it. 
This is not to say that we should not consider such concerns 
and qualifications, but rather that we relay them to future 
research and publications. In light of the relative novelty of 
Levinas's work in physiotherapy, our hope here is that this 
article will highlight the critical need for a deeper engagement 
with his work and its various benefits and limitations. We 
believe this to be necessary because ethics is critical to 
physiotherapy, and because Levinas's work provides an 
underexplored perspective on ethics with radically 
transformative implications for our professional theories and 
practices. 
Emmanuel Levinas - a brief introduction 
Born in 1906 in the Jewish community of Russian-occupied 
Kovno (now Kaunas, Lithuania), Levinas’s upbringing was 
steeped in both Jewish thought and the classical Russian 
literature. Reflecting on this time in several interviews, 
Levinas speaks of Judaism as that which ‘one breathed … in 
with the air’ on the one hand (Levinas & Anissimov, 2001, p. 
84), and with reference to Russian literature, as that which led 
him to the philosophy of the other, ‘specifically Pushkin, 
Lermontov, and … above all Dostoyevsky’ (Levinas & Poirié, 
2001, p. 28). Levinas found the novels of Dostoyevsky and 
Tolstoy ‘preoccupied with fundamental things … readable as a 
search for the meaning of life’ (Levinas & Poirié, 2001, p. 28).  
Choosing ‘France on account of the prestige of the French’ and 
in France, ‘the city closest to Lithuania’ Levinas went on to 
study philosophy in Strasbourg in 1923 (Levinas & Poirié, 
2001, p. 28). There, he read classical philosophical works from 
Plato and other Greek philosophers through to Descartes, but 
also famous contemporary philosophers of the time like Henri 
Bergson. An academic year spent in Freiburg, Germany, 
during which he met and studied under the famous 
phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, 
was, however, particularly significant to the development of 
his future method and thought. 
Highly impressed by both of these thinkers, Levinas engaged 
deeply with both of their works, as is evident very early on in 
the publication of his doctorate thesis on ​The Theory of 
Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology​ in 1930 (Levinas, 
1995). Though he played a major role in introducing 
Husserlian phenomenology to French philosophers like Sartre 
and others as a result of this publication, Levinas would later 
recount that the main import of Husserl to his own work was 
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‘listen acutely for what is implicit’, to pay ‘special attention to 
what is allusive in thinking’ (Levinas & Malka, 2001, p. 
94-95). Levinas argued that building on Husserl’s method of 
phenomenological reduction, and the general sentiment that 
phenomenology enabled one to get behind the appearance and 
to the very essence of phenomena, eventually enabled him to 
explore the limits of being and knowledge, and in this limit, ‘a 
forgotten experience from which it lives’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 
28). 
The relation to Heidegger would prove more difficult, though 
even more influential, as it was Heidegger that became 
Levinas’s ‘most important philosophical rival, providing the 
philosophical resources, constraints, and pressure’ against 
which Levinas would eventually develop his argument for 
‘ethics as first philosophy’ (Fagenblat, 2018, p.3). To fully 
appreciate how Heidegger’s work became so crucial to the 
shaping of Levinas’s philosophy, it is necessary to consider 
Levinas’s experience of the Second World War. Levinas was 
profoundly shaken by Heidegger’s affiliation to National 
Socialism, his membership of the Nazi Party, and Heidegger’s 
public political commitment to its project. Levinas simply 
could not understand, as Critchley explains, ‘how a 
philosopher as undeniably brilliant as Heidegger could have 
become a Nazi, for however short a time’ (Critchley, 2002, 
p.8). 
Notwithstanding his antipathy towards Heidegger’s position, 
the rise of Nazism during WWII was the more profoundly 
affecting experience. As Levinas himself would repeatedly 
state, his life and work were ‘dominated by the presentiment 
and the memory of the Nazi horror’ (Levinas, 1990, p. 291). 
Being incarcerated as a prisoner of war very early on, he found 
himself in a peculiar and somewhat paradoxical situation 
during this time. Recognised and segregated as a Jew, yet 
spared by his French uniform and the immunity it provided as 
a result of the Geneva convention, Levinas spent the war 
working, and even reading and writing philosophy in a prison 
camp virtually cut off from the outside world. It was only after 
being freed that Levinas learned of the full extent of the Nazi 
atrocities: ‘the horrors of the camps’; the killing of his entire 
family; and the murder of 6,000,000 fellow Jews and 
countless others (Levinas & Poirié, 2001, p. 42). 
Much like for so many other philosophers and 
non-philosophers alike, the bigger question that posed itself 
after WWII then was ultimately how Nazism, and all of the 
atrocities that were enacted in its wake, were even ever 
possible. Levinas wrote in ​Totality and Infinity​ – his first 
major work, that, ‘Everyone will readily agree that it is of the 
highest importance to know whether we are not duped by 
morality’ (Levinas, 1969, p. 21). In other words, Levinas’s 
broader, central question became whether it was still possible 
and sensible to speak of ethics after its failure in WWII, 
‘whether we can still believe in morality after Auschwitz’, and 
if so, how might this be possible (Bernstein, 2002, p. 254)? 
It is in relation to this question that the full significance of 
Heidegger’s thought on Levinas’s work became clear, as it was 
Heidegger’s thought that ‘provided a way of understanding the 
deep philosophical roots of the weed that was Hitlerism’ 
(Fagenblat, 2018, p. 12). And although Levinas never entirely 
conflated Heideggerian philosophy with Hitlerism (Fagenblat, 
2018), he still found in it philosophical access to ‘a crisis that 
is much more profound, and older’ (Levinas, 1989, p. 207). It 
is this crisis that Levinas ultimately turned his attention to in 
his ‘critical questioning of Heidegger’s project of fundamental 
ontology’ and his search for an otherwise fundamental 
philosophy that could provide the grounds for a different, 
ethical way of being (Critchley, 2002, p. 9). Due to the breadth 
of Levinas’s philosophical work and the diverse implications 
that can be drawn from his works we have restricted this 
article to Levinas’s critique of the philosophical foundations of 
a vast majority of Western philosophy which, in primary 
reference to Heidegger, he referred to as ontology. Further 
overviews of Levinas’s philosophical oeuvre can be found his 
own writings, as well as many other publications covering 
various aspects of his life (Bergo, 2007; Critchley & 
Bernasconi, 2002; Levinas, 1990; Levinas & Nemo, 1985; 
Malka, 2006; von Wolzogen, 2005). Of particular relevance 
here, however, is the development of Levinas’s critique of the 
violence of ontology.  
Thematisation - the violence of ontology 
Heidegger's work continues to exert wide influence in and 
outside of philosophy despite his affiliation with National 
Socialism, with his magnum opus – ​Being and Time​ – 
remaining his most influential study (Heidegger, 2008). 
Heidegger wrote ​Being and Time​ as an attempt to uncover the 
fundamental nature of existence or being (Sein) through a 
phenomenological analysis of human existence (Dasein) 
(Korab-Karpowicz, 2019). According to Levinas, Heidegger’s 
analysis led him to argue that 'being' itself is the fundamental 
ground of existence, because its main characteristics are its 
'being there' (Dasein) and 'being conscious' of itself. 
Though Levinas held Being and Time in the highest regard, he 
ultimately used it as the backdrop for the development of his 
critique of ontology, beginning with a concern about the 
self-referential idea of existence proposed by Heidegger. 
Levinas argues that Heidegger's ontology is essentially 
epistemological because it essentially advances the idea that 
existence comes into being with and through knowledge of 
itself. Thus understood, epistemology (knowledge and 
knowing) is the fundamental mode of being (ontology) 
(Levinas, 1987). In arguing for this conflation of ontology and 
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Levinas perceives to be the central problem of the entire 
Western philosophical tradition since Plato (Critchley, 2002). 
The consequences of this conflation then form the central 
motivation for Levinas's critique of Western philosophy, all 
the way through to Heidegger's fundamental ontology. To 
Levinas, Heidegger's ontology describes a situation where 
knowledge, or knowing is the first and foremost way that 
humans exist in and interact with the world (Levinas, 1969). 
This has two implications for everyone or everything different 
from being, or other than the self. First, it implies that the 
other, as much as the relationship to the other, is secondary to 
the self. Already in itself, to consider human existence as 
always concerned with self before being concerned with others 
will rightly seem problematic ethically speaking.  
The problem is exacerbated by the second implication, which 
is that knowledge becomes the first and fundamental way in 
which one can relate to anything, or anyone else. Everything 
and everyone other than self is only ever approached and 
engaged with from a perspective of knowledge (Critchley, 
2002). From this perspective, the other is already defined and 
identified as a knowable entity, something that can be known 
and that cannot and will not exceed the limits of knowledge.  
Moreover, because knowledge is but a version of or expression 
for the self, the other is never allowed to be genuinely and 
distinctly other. Worse still, because there can be nothing 
outside of the self and its knowledge, the other is never 
allowed to exist in the first place. In a world based on being 
and knowledge and, therefore, without others, however, there 
are no relationships and, ultimately, no ethics. 
Levinas used a variety of terms to describe this dramatic effect 
of knowledge and understanding it as fundamental, from 
reducing and limiting the other, through suppression, 
assimilation and, finally, undoing and annihilation of the 
other and all otherness. In his own words, 'the known is 
understood and so appropriated by knowledge, and as it were, 
freed of its otherness' (Levinas, 1989, p. 76). Entering into a 
relationship to come to know the other is violent because it 
implies this limitation of the other. By reducing the other to 
the epistemological capacities of the self and the categories of 
its knowledge, knowing, effectively, denies and ends the 
existence of the other, the ultimate violent act.  
The following quote by Simon Critchley provides a particularly 
lucid and visual reiteration of Levinas's argument. Because it 
matches the critique of knowledge with terminology related to 
movement and the use of hands, it should be additionally 
familiar to physiotherapists: 
'In ontology, the other is assimilated... like so much food and 
drink… ontology is the movement of comprehension, which 
takes possession of things through the activity of labor, 
where conceptual labor resembles manual labor. Ontology is 
like the movement of the hand, the organ for grasping and 
seizing, which takes hold of (prend) and comprehends 
(comprend) things in a manipulation of otherness'​ (Critchley, 
2002, p. 16). 
Levinas eventually refers to violence exerted by knowledge as 
thematisation​ or ​totalisation​. This is, firstly, in reference to 
the way the other is approached and objectified as something 
knowable, a 'theme'. And, secondly, in reference to the way the 
other is assimilated into the encompassing ​totality​ of the self 
via the movement of comprehension (Levinas, 1969). 
Whichever terms we use though, the full strength of Levinas's 
critique of theoretical frameworks based on ontology and 
epistemology or, knowledge, lies in their exposure as 
philosophies of power (Levinas, 1969, p. 46).  
It might be tempting to argue that the scathing language 
Levinas uses to express the violence of thematisation is hardly 
appropriate, given its seemingly abstract, conceptual nature. 
To better understand this then, we should remember that 
Levinas was primarily concerned with the underlying 
conceptual, or philosophical foundations that enable violence 
against others in the first place and irrespective of scale. At 
this fundamental level, there is no difference between the 
conceptual and the physical annihilation of the other. 
Furthermore, if we understand that this conceptual 
foundation is necessary for more noticeable, physical violence 
against others to take place, then it should be evident how 
important it is to address the problem at its root rather than 
its branches. We keep our focus aligned with this in the 
present article, rather than engage in an attempt to qualify 
what kind of violence might be more or less bad. 
With this in mind, the case Levinas makes is of grave 
importance to those who think and practice in the health 
arena. His critique strikes at the heart of what it means to be a 
healthcare professional, where being a professional is first and 
foremost defined by what we know about health, illness and 
those in our care and how we act on the basis of this 
knowledge. Radically speaking, Levinas's critique of ontology 
and the exposure of its violence of thematisation challenges 
the entire philosophical basis of Western healthcare, arguing 
that it is fundamentally violent and, ultimately, unethical. 
The fundamental violence of physiotherapy 
Mainstream contemporary physiotherapy builds on Western 
science and medicine, both of which are firmly grounded in 
ontology and epistemology as outlined here. As a result, the 
violence of thematisation inevitably pervades the profession’s 
most fundamental theoretical concepts, as well as the clinical 
and professional practices built on these. In this section, we first 
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physiotherapy to extrapolate how this is the case there, before 
looking at how this fundamental violence plays out in three 
different areas of clinical and professional theory and practice: 
the overarching aims of physiotherapy, the theory and practice 
of diagnosis; and the notion and enforcing of professional 
identities. 
The philosophical foundations of 
physiotherapy 
Levinas’s critique of ontology and its inherent violence are 
particularly relevant to the philosophical foundations of 
physiotherapy, because they lay the groundwork for its 
application to other professional theories and practices. As 
with nursing, midwifery, occupational therapy, and other 
orthodox health professions, the philosophical foundations of 
physiotherapy have had a longstanding affinity with 
biomedicine. This is, in part, because the medical profession 
established itself as the pre-eminent healthcare profession in 
the developed world after the middle of the nineteenth 
century. Biomedicine brought forward significant advances in 
the scientific method, and aggressively promoted positivism 
and Enlightenment principles of the primacy of the 
autonomous, self-determining and sovereign human 
(Nicholls, 2018). 
Physiotherapy followed biomedicine in adopting the idea of a 
single objective reality (Nicholls, 2009). This belief upheld a 
number of critical assumptions underpinning the scientific 
basis of physiotherapy theory and practice, including the 
belief that reality, phenomena, or objects exist separate and 
independent of subjective experience, or subjectivity. This 
view held that every object has a distinct nature, or essence of 
its own; which, thanks to its separate nature and existence, 
can be distinguished, observed, and identified through the 
rigorous application of scientific methods. Critically, other 
entities – including people, bodies, actions, intentions, values 
and beliefs – can be known by a knowledge-gaining and 
knowledge-bearing subject (Crotty, 1998; Grant & Giddings, 
2002). 
The belief in a single objective reality and the related 
fundamental assumptions of positivism have been extensively 
critiqued elsewhere (Giddings & Grant, 2007; Proietti et al., 
2019). Although never before applied directly to 
physiotherapy, our contention is that Levinas challenges the 
positivistic basis of physiotherapy and both its ontological 
relation to reality in which the object-other is identified and 
approached as a knowable, or ​thematisable​ entity; and its 
belief that the practitioner is the knowing, doing ego; the 
expert that identifies, gains and defines knowledge about the 
other (Grant & Giddings, 2002, p. 14-15). 
In recent years, other critiques of the positivism inherent in 
evidence-based biomedicine (and, by extension, 
physiotherapy) have emerged, not least from those advocating 
for person-centred care, holistic medicine, qualitative 
research, narrative-based medicine and the humanities 
(Clifton- Soderstrom, 2003; Gibson & Martin, 2003; 
Greenhalgh, Howick, & Maskrey, 2014; Holmes et al., 2006; 
Miles, Loughlin, & Polychronis, 2008; Shaw, 2012). Levinas’s 
work, however, enables us to go much further than these and 
argue that positivism, upon which biomedicine is based, 
leaves no room for difference. Biomedicine, then, limits the 
otherness of the other through an ‘imposition of scientific 
language on illness experiences which universalises persons 
into general categories’ without fully acknowledging their 
particular and unknowable otherness (Clifton-Soderstrom, 
2003, p. 459). 
As explained in the preceding section, Levinas developed his 
critique of thematisation in response to Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology, which in turn is tied to the latter’s 
understanding of application of phenomenology. 
Phenomenology, in turn, developed at least partly as a 
response to positivist sciences and represents an early 
acknowledgement of the limitations of objectivity (Grant & 
Giddings, 2002). Insofar as phenomenology is utilised as a 
means to accumulate knowledge however, there is no 
substantial difference between phenomenology and positivism 
from a Levinassian perspective. 
Levinas's critique directly targets positivism's desire to 
manipulate​ reality and 'explain, predict or control events' 
(Critchley, 2002, p. 16). As argued elsewhere, the desire to 
know and control phenomena lies at the 'philosophical heart 
of all clinical trials, experimental and quasi-experimental 
designs, epidemiological surveys, single-incidence studies, 
tests of validity and reliability, and a plethora of other 
quantitative designs' (Nicholls, 2009, p. 528). The 
epistemological tools employed by positivism, phenomenology 
and other methodologies aimed at accumulating knowledge 
adhere to the same ontological and epistemological 
foundations (Grant & Giddings, 2002, p. 13-14). They build on 
the assumption that reality can (and must) be known and that 
knowledge is the primary mode through which reality should 
be encountered. 
Modern physiotherapy builds on and promotes knowledge as 
the basis for ethical and clinical decision making and the 
prediction of rehabilitation trajectories. Levinas's critique, 
therefore, directly relates to the philosophical foundations of 
physiotherapy and everything that builds on them. This is 
especially important if we realise that engaging these 
philosophical foundations in the search for knowledge 
constitutes an action or practice in itself. It is limiting and 
reducing the phenomena we encounter to that which our 
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be otherwise or different, thus reiterating the fundamental 
violence of thematisation. 
Highlighting this practical side is crucial insofar as it shows 
that the violence of thematisation is immediately and 
inherently far from merely conceptual. This violence is 
enacted as soon as we approach the other as a knowable 
entity, suffering from an entirely knowable phenomenon. 
Because this is quintessentially what evidence-based practice 
implies we can begin to recognise how professional theories 
and practices that build on these foundations inevitably 
perpetuate the problem. 
The aim of physiotherapy 
The overarching aim of physiotherapy provides a pertinent 
example of how thematisation plays out in other areas of the 
profession because they more overtly guide what we do in 
everyday clinical practice. A growing number of researchers 
are showing that the philosophical foundations of 
physiotherapy have shaped some of its central concepts and 
professional practices, often in a manner that is reductive and 
restrictive to diversity or otherness. This has been argued with 
regard to physiotherapy's notions of the body, movement, 
function, normality, and therapeutic touch (Allen, 2007; Bähr, 
Nicholls & Holmes, 2012; Cott, Finch, & Gasner, 1995; Gibson, 
2014; Gibson & Teachman, 2012; Jorgensen, 2000; Rosberg, 
2000; Wikström- Grotell & Eriksson, 2012). Considering the 
Levinassian critique of ontology allows us to interrogate how 
the profession's aim exerts a, paradoxically, similarly 
delimiting or disabling violence on those it seeks to aid. 
According to the World Confederation for Physical Therapy 
(WCPT), one of the foremost aims of physiotherapy is 'to 
provide services that develop, maintain and restore people's 
maximum movement and functional ability' (WCPT, 2016). 
Taken by itself, this aim resonates closely with Levinassian 
sentiments against limiting others to one or another 
knowledge-based category. Especially in the aspiration to 
'develop, maintain and restore people's maximum movement', 
it sets up physiotherapy as a profession primarily focussed on 
taking down barriers to maximum mobility and further 
supporting it.  
If we now consider Levinas's notion of 'otherness' from an 
etymological perspective, we will soon find its resonance to 
the aim to maximise movement. Levinas often uses alterity as 
an alternative term for otherness, with both terms essentially 
meaning the same. To reduce otherness, then, means to 
reduce the other's ability to be ​alter, or other​ than knowledge, 
to exceed the limits imposed by knowledge. Etymologically, 
this ability to (be) alter or change precisely implies the ability 
to be ​mobile​, that is, able to move (Harper, 2019). Thus 
understood, Levinassian ethics could be said to aim at 
maximum (epistemological) movement wherever this is 
limited and not only condemns any such limitation as 
disabling, violent and even unethical.  
A problem arises, however, where what counts as movement is 
further defined in terms of knowledge gained through the 
application of epistemological tools. Given its broader context 
as a healthcare profession, the aim of physiotherapy is, for 
example, heavily influenced by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) definition of health as 'a state of complete physical, 
mental and social well being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity' (WHO, 1948). Translated in terms of 
physiotherapy's overarching aim, this state of wellbeing must 
be associated with maximum movement and functional 
ability. The issue here, however, is that to equate maximum 
movement with a state is a contradiction in terms because a 
'state' quintessentially implies a lack of movement, a standing 
still. 
That determining the state of health is indeed what the WHO 
invests in is also visible in the WHO's International 
Classification of Functioning, Disability & Health (ICF). The 
ICF provides a tool for the comparison and measurement of 
'levels of health', using 'optimal health' as its benchmark, a 
'common metric … applicable to all people irrespective of 
health condition' (WHO, 2002, p. 3). The use of 
epistemological tools and practices like measurement, 
calculation, quantification and scaling clearly shows the extent 
to which WHO's definitions of health and function are 
grounded in positivist ontological assumptions. As such, 
however, they also perpetuate the violence of thematisation, 
making movement and function 'themes' that can be defined 
and that further serve the ranking of people according to 
(thematic) levels of function. 
Building on WHO's definitions of health and functioning, 
physiotherapy commonly considers movement in rather 
narrow terms as, for example, physical ranges of movement of 
specific joints, or time spent engaging in physical activity at 
particular heart rates. Keeping in mind how doing so 
effectively contradicts the aim of supporting ​maximum 
movement in a broader sense, thus affords a possibility to 
review what we do before a more rigorous, ethical 
understanding of our professional aim. If the aim of maximum 
movement were followed through more consistently, 
physiotherapy could effectively work in tandem with 
Levinassian ethics. That is, as practices aimed at supporting, 
maintaining, and restoring mobility at any level, physical, 
mental, epistemological, or else. 
The theory and practice of diagnosis 
The theory and practice of diagnosis provide another example 
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(1993) argued in his reading of Levinas and the notion of 
thematisation, the 'first act of violence occurs whenever I limit 
the other to a set of rational categories, be they racial, sexual, 
or otherwise' (Beavers, 1999, p. 3). Translated to the context 
of clinical practice, this means that the thematisation happens 
in the application of diagnostic procedures to a client 
presenting with health problems. 
Standard approaches to practice mandate that patients are 
approached, observed, interviewed, and examined from the 
perspective of our professional knowledge, and diagnostic 
categories of mainstream healthcare are applied. Without a 
doubt, putatively individual factors, such as client goals, are 
also considered in this process. However, they mostly serve 
the process of establishing a diagnosis according to 
specialised, epistemological, diagnostic labels like 'lumbar 
sprain', 'subacromial pain syndrome', and 'plantar fasciitis'. 
The issue with such diagnostic labels from a Levinassian 
perspective, however, is that they facilitate a reduction and 
limitation of a client to nothing but 'that hip I see on 
Tuesdays', 'the ACL in room 4', and so on. In doing so, the act 
of diagnosis incapacitates and immobilises the other by 
disabling the client to go or be anything beyond the 
epistemological and operational category it provides. 
Existential philosopher Søren Kierkegaard purportedly 
expressed the sentiment that 'once you label me, you negate 
me', which strongly resonates here (McManus, 2019). The 
diagnostic label constrains the potential to be 'other' than the 
label. By additionally grouping the client in with similarly 
labelled other 'shoulders', 'knees', or else, it further reduces 
the particularity of each individual client. As a result, the act 
of diagnosis itself might, paradoxically, oppose 'the ethical 
foundation of medicine' (Clifton-Soderstrom, 2003). This 
foundation is precisely to support the other in their individual 
and irreducible otherness or, as expressed in the aim of 
physiotherapy, to maximise their mobility. 
There are many nuances to the theory and practice of 
diagnosis that we cannot explore in the context of this article. 
Diagnostic labels have undoubtedly also played a significant 
role in advancing medical science and treatments, not least 
through the reductive focus they enable. In their day-to-day 
clinical application, they are certainly also not applied with 
ill-intention but, in fact, the precise contrary. Looking at 
diagnosis from a Levinassian perspective, however, enables us 
to see how a subtle, but significant violence nonetheless takes 
place and underlies one of our most basic professional 
practices. Because it is so contrary to our professional 
aspiration to maximise movement, we believe that to draw 
attention to it is of utmost importance. As such, it might need 
careful review to prevent it from incapacitating and 
immobilising those in our care, rather than developing, 
maintaining, and restoring mobility. 
Professional identity 
Thematisation is not only relevant to patients, but also affects 
physiotherapy professionals, particularly in the way we 
understand and construct professional identity. In itself, the 
notion of identity stands in contrast to Levinas's emphasis on 
(individual) difference as a fundamental ethical requirement. 
Levinas would often express these in his critique of terms like 
identity, sameness and identification, which effectively 
translates to 'making same'.  
Professional identity then quintessentially implies a 'making 
same' of a group of professionals and already as such contrasts 
or delimits any more radical take on diversity. It enables only 
diversity within defined parameters. The WCPT, for example, 
promotes the notion that certain personal and professional 
behaviours, values, codes and practices are an integral part of 
a physiotherapists professional identity (WCPT, 2011a). The 
objective identification and normative codification of 
parameters like these further narrow the fundamental 
limitation already implied in the term 'professional identity'. 
This additional narrowing down, however, is what is necessary 
to homogenise a disparate group of individuals into 
'physiotherapists'.  
Not surprisingly, the development of professional sameness is 
also a critical element built into professional education. It first 
takes place in undergraduate education, as physiotherapy 
students 'attain the knowledge, skills, and attributes described 
in the guidelines for physical therapist professional entry-level 
education' (WCPT, 2011b). Continuing professional 
development then further promotes the idea that the 
knowledge, skills, and attributes acquired in undergraduate 
education need to be maintained, developed and enhanced on 
an ongoing basis to retain one's standing (i.e. identity) as a 
physiotherapist. In the same wake, regulatory authorities are 
deployed to ensure that a practitioner's personal values do not 
transgress their professional identities. 
On the one hand, we could argue that undergraduate 
education represents a time of self-development insofar as 
one's self is changed throughout its course. On the other hand, 
however, this development is directed towards a 
pre-determined professional identity. Whether as a 
replacement or addition to self-development, the aim of this 
process is the development of a homogenous professional 
identity distinguishable from the heterogeneous personal 
selves of the thousands of people that become therapists. 
While the WCPT's definition of CPD implies that personal 
skills, knowledge, and behaviours are supplementary to 
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their difference and the further exclusion of the personal from 
the professional (WCPT, 2011a). 
The supplementary and subordinate relationship of personal 
to professional identity is also evident in the kinds of reflective 
practice and supervision advocated for by professional bodies 
internationally. Supervision, for example, is aimed at 'helping 
the development of a professional identity' (PNZ, 2012, p. 1), 
while professional self-reflection aims at 'improving or 
affirming... professional practice' (PBNZ, 2011, p. 22). Both 
practices then perpetuate the development and ongoing 
conformity of professional identity over the development of 
more personal modes of reflection. As practices of 
identification, they aid in aligning physiotherapists with their 
professional group-identity, and, so, subordinate, assimilate, 
exclude, reduce, and even undo the unique and idiosyncratic 
otherness​ of the practitioner.  
Though there are undeniable variations amongst 
professionals, the ongoing definition and implementation of a 
broad professional identity that constrains personal diversity 
thus prevail throughout our professional practices. From a 
Levinassian perspective, this professional identity presents a 
restricted category that enacts that same violence of 
thematisation on its very own members. For a profession that 
aspires to 'develop, maintain and restore people's maximum 
movement' this seems an irreconcilable tension at its very 
heart (WCPT, 2016). 
Toward an otherwise physiotherapy 
This brief review of the aim of physiotherapy, the theory and 
practice of diagnosis, and the concept and development of 
professional identity highlights how firmly physiotherapy is 
grounded in (positivist) ontology and epistemology. Building 
on Levinas's critique of ontology this implies that 
physiotherapy perpetuates the fundamental violence of 
thematisation, that is, the reduction and limitation of all 
otherness to the categories and capacities of knowledge and 
the knowing (professional) self. This, however, also means 
that physiotherapy also enacts an inadvertent limitation, 
rather than the mobilisation of otherness. Applying Levinas's 
critique of ontology to physiotherapy, thus, implies a ​radical 
critique of the profession in the original sense of the term 
radical. It exposes the (epistemological) violence of 
thematisation at the 'roots' of physiotherapy. 
A sizable issue that this radical critique raises is that it appears 
to leave the profession with little theories or practices to work 
with that are not fundamentally violent. If the knowledge with 
which we identify and the practices that we develop restrain 
the other, rather than enable movement, what justification is 
there for physiotherapy practice? What and how are we to 
practice following such radical critique? 
In line with the growing body of work in critical 
physiotherapy, we believe that the principal benefit of the 
critical study of physiotherapy lies in exposing otherwise 
unnoticed and unreflected problems that pervade its theories 
and practices (Setchell, Nicholls, Wilson & Gibson, 2018). In 
the present case, it is the exposure of an underlying, but as yet 
unseen act of violence at the heart of physiotherapy theory 
and practice because of its grounding in ontology and 
epistemology. By highlighting that this violence runs counter 
to our therapeutic aspiration to 'develop, maintain and restore 
people's maximum movement', we hope to open the door to 
other ways to imagine physiotherapy that are coherent with 
this aim (WCPT, 2016). 
Before going on to point to a few other ways that the 
Levinassian critique of ontology might inspire an otherwise 
physiotherapy, we should acknowledge that the difficulty to 
put Levinassian ethics into practice has maybe been a 
significant point of contention in the reception of his work. 
This also includes the impossibility to escape ontology and 
epistemology, as much as (conscious) knowing and doing 
entirely. The issue has led to the outright dismissal of 
Levinassian ethics as impractical on the one hand, versus its 
assertion as 'the (only) basis for effective ethical action' on the 
other' (Zeillinger, 2009).  
Going into the necessary detail of this discussion and how it 
might be resolved is beyond the scope of the present article. In 
the following, we outline a few ways in which we might at least 
approximate the mitigation of the violence of thematisation in 
physiotherapy practice. These ideas are closer in line with the 
latter position in this debate and a reading of Levinassian 
ethics that we have developed elsewhere, which additionally 
draws on a range of closely resonating Asian philosophies and 
practices in an attempt to provide an otherwise resolution to 
the problem of practising Levinassian ethics (Maric, 2017). 
The overarching implication of Levinas's critique of ontology 
lies in its call to interrupt our conventional ways of thinking 
and doing physiotherapy, in full recognition of the underlying 
harm they cause. This is a profoundly disruptive call since 
virtually all of our professional self-understanding and sense 
of agency builds on knowledge and practices that thematise 
the other and the phenomena we encounter. Drawing on 
resonant Asian philosophical practices and, in a sense, 
thinking with Levinas in the extreme, we argue that the initial 
aim of an otherwise physiotherapy would have to be to refrain 
from or at least minimise the violence enacted in our 
professional knowledge and practices. We suggest and explore 
letting-go as an otherwise therapeutic practice in line with this 
aim by applying it to the physiotherapy theories and practices 
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minimise the iatrogenic violence incurred through the 
constraining grip of our professional knowledge and practices 
and so mobilise or liberate the other from their constraints. 
Beginning with the aim of physiotherapy, we could say that 
Levinas's critique of ontology supports a person-centred 
approach to physiotherapy (Kidd, Bond, & Bell, 2011, p. 155). 
This is specifically insofar as a critical aspect of 
person-centred care is to incorporate patient's aims 'needs 
and perspectives' in a way that is 'complementary to the 
traditional diagnostic and procedural hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning' (Cruz, Caeiro and Pereira, 2013, p. 6). In 
Levinasian terms, the integration of patients aims interrupts 
the possibility to define and thus delimit curative aims 
objectively and a priori. Withholding or even letting go of the 
latter entirely is all about minimising the restriction such 
external aims can incur and mobilising highly subjective and 
dynamic aims to be formulated and continuously 
reformulated by (or in partnership with) our patients. 
However, there is a limit to Levinas's potential support of 
patient-centred care in this regard, where patient's aims are 
only made space for as a proxy for a new and different 
thematisation (Armstrong, 1999). That is, if we are only 
'listening attentively' to our client's aims and hopes as a 
pathway to rigidly defined diagnosis and treatment after all 
(Burcher, 2011, p. 13). With Levinas, we must do something 
more radical if we are to truly relate to 'patients in a manner 
that respects their alterity and otherness' (Clifton-Soderstrom, 
2013, p. 458). Beyond merely listening attentively for the 
same final purpose as before, the critique of thematisation 
urges us to ​hesitate​ far more ​rigorously​ (Ronell & 
Dufourmantelle, 2011). It suggests making this hesitation a 
continuous​ practice, an ​ongoing effort​ of '​staying​ open to the 
full speech and discourse of the other', as suggested by Adam 
(2016) in a resonant discussion of Lacanian psychoanalysis (p. 
119, emphasis added).  
The idea of letting go and staying open in practice is further 
clarified if applied to the practice of diagnosis. In relation to 
diagnostic practices, it would consist of continuously 
refraining 'from representing and offering a closed knowledge' 
to the client and then implementing this as the basis of 
practice (Translated from Adam, 2006, p. 119). The focus of 
practice would not be on identifying a specific pathology and 
treating only this according to a set of professional standards. 
Instead, it would be to shift our focus to continuously 
acknowledging, rehabilitating, or mobilising the possibility 
that every client and every client's malady could just be 
different from what we think, time and time again. It is 
mobilising difference, otherness or diversity in a much more 
radical manner. Not just qualifying our diagnosis as 
potentially 'provisional', but not applying a diagnostic label at 
all, not closing a category (ACC, 2019).  
Extending this to the notion and creation of professional 
identity, Levinas's critique of ontology also supports current 
developments in reviewing and promoting diversity in 
physiotherapy (Andrion, 2017; Ross & Setchell, 2019). But 
here as well, it effectively urges us to let go of the notion of 
professional identity and the restrictive practices we engage in 
its wake. In this sense, it also goes further than expanding 
professional identity according to diversity defined as 
inclusivity of one or another (group of) persons, which 
inevitably always implies excluding others. At a baseline, the 
Levinassian critique of (professional) identity adds sensitivity 
and strength to the call for a physiotherapy theory and 
practice based on a full acknowledgement and preservation of 
the fundamental otherness of other persons, client or 
practitioner (Clifton-Soderstrom, 2013, p. 458; Critchley, 
2002, p. 26). Well beyond this, however, it calls for a radical 
openness to any kind of other (or otherness), for diversity, 
paradoxically, defined as openness. This, in turn, requires a 
rigorous and continuous letting-go wherever the inclination to 
restrict reappears.  
More poignantly, the idea and practice of letting go of our 
professional identity as we have understood it so far - defined 
by professional knowledge, aims and practices - invites a 
fundamental review of how we understand and relate to our 
personal and professional selves, as well as the others in our 
care. The opportunity provided by Levinas's critique of 
ontology and the violence of thematisation is precisely the 
radical cutting back to nearly nothing. It seems to us that this 
'taking the house down' is necessary before we begin to build a 
new one. Though we have not been able to explore this in the 
present article, this is also where the full strength and benefit 
of Levinas's work for physiotherapy actually lies. That is, not 
only in the astute critique of our hitherto identity and 
concomitant practices but also in providing a rich resource for 
imagining an otherwise physiotherapy that is not grounded in 
being, knowledge and doing.  
Conclusion 
Drawing on Levinas's critique of ontology highlights how the 
fundamental violence of thematisation pervades 
physiotherapy theory and practice. It can be traced through its 
positivist, biomedical philosophical and scientific foundations, 
through our professional self-understanding and agency, and 
even our most common day-to-day practices. This radical 
questioning of the professional has concrete implications for 
physiotherapy theory, practice, and education. It supports 
contemporary advances in person-centred healthcare by 
highlighting the need to acknowledge and preserve their 
particularity in theory and practice at all times. Reaching well 
beyond this, however, Levinas's critique of ontology 
challenges us to fundamentally review how we relate to 
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our critical professional work might be grounded in other 
foundations than ontology and epistemology, which, with 
Levinas, implies a grounding in fundamental ethics. 
This is also of critical import to physiotherapy education 
insofar as it is in education that professional agency and a first 
sense and understanding of professional identity are 
developed and can, therefore, be transformed in the most 
lasting manner. Building the critique of ontology, the central 
focus of Levinas's work was on describing a different, ethical 
relationship between self and other. Consequently, his work is 
of twofold interest to physiotherapy theory and practice. On 
the one hand, in the critical sense laid out in the present 
article and, on the other, in its potential to inspire an 
otherwise physiotherapy theory and practice in the future. 
There is ample space for future research then, to explore what 
might be considered the productive potential, but also the 
limitations of Levinas's work that follow the critique of 
ontology that we have focussed on here. 
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